ECON-UN 3211 - Intermediate Microeconomics

Recitation 6: The Producer's Problem II - The Supply Decision

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Review of relevant concepts

The Producer's Problem II: Profit maximization + supply choice

1

Practice questions

Midterm feedback

See recording of Recitations 7 for discussions of the greations emphasized have

Q1. Find a utility function representing the following preferences (a) Jesabelle spends all of her income on the good with the lowest price

- $\cdot \ u(x) = x_1 + x_2$
- Also valid: symmetric concave preferences like u(x) = max{x₁, x₂}
- Some people wrote $u(x) = \alpha x_1 + \beta x_2$ but this only works when $\alpha = \beta$

Q1. Find a utility function representing the following preferences (b) Carly always buys an equal number of units of good 1 and 2

- $\cdot u(x) = \min\{x_1, x_2\}$
- Some people wrote $u(x) = \min\{\alpha x_1, \beta x_2\}$ but this only works when $\alpha = \beta$

Q2. With two budget lines, illustrate the income and substitution effects when the price of good 1 increases and preferences are Cobb-Douglas

- Draw the correct budget lines
- Show the correct direction of change: a price increase in good 1 means any substitution effect will involve consuming less of good 1 and more of good 2
- Label the effects properly: it's the change in x_1 and x_2
- Capturing the zero cross-price effect of the Cobb-Douglas

Q4. Derive the Marshallian demand for preferences $u(x) = 12\sqrt{x_1} + x_2$

- Recognize this is an example of quasi-linear utility
- Our approch for these: assume an interior solution and see where it is feasible
- If nowhere, then we only have corner solutions
- If only in some places, then we will have piecewise demand and at least two cases (which is the case here)

Review of relevant concepts

The Producer's Problem I: Cost Minimization (Recitation 5)

$$\max(\operatorname{Profit}) = \max(\operatorname{Revenue} - \operatorname{Cost}) = \max_{q} \{p(q)q - c(q)\}$$

Step 1: Cost minimization

$$\min_{\{x_1, x_2\}} W_1 X_1 + W_2 X_2$$

s.t. $f(x_1, x_2) \ge q$

Given:

- technological constraint $f(x_1, x_2)$
- input prices w₁, w₂
- \cdot output quantity q

Derive:

- conditional factor demand functions $x_1^*(w_1, w_2, q)$ $x_2^*(w_1, w_2, q)$
- \cdot cost function

 $c(q) = w_1 x_1^*(w_1, w_2, q) + w_2 x_2^*(w_1, w_2, q)$

$$\max(\operatorname{Profit}) = \max(\operatorname{Revenue} - \operatorname{Cost}) = \max_{q} \{p(q)q - c(q)\}$$

Step 2: The supply decision

$$\max_{q} p(q)q - c(q)$$

s.t. $q \ge 0$

Given

- Consumer demand function q(p)
- Producers' cost function c(q)

Derive:


- Marginal revenue *MR*(*q*)
- Marginal cost MC(q)
- Profit-maximizing supply decision $q^* \ge 0$
- Maximal profit $\pi^* = p(q^*)q^* c(q^*)$

Total costs

The cost function we've derived is called the total cost function, which can be decomposed as such:

TC(q) = FC + VC(q)

- Fixed costs FC
 - The costs that don't depend on quantity
 - "Fixed" in the short run
- Variable costs VC(q)
 - The costs that do depend on quantity
 - \cdot Can be varied in the short run



$$AC(q) = \frac{C(q)}{q}$$

- Cost function divided by quantity: the cost per unit of output
- Average cost = average fixed costs
 + average variable costs

Marginal costs

$$MC(q) = \frac{dTC(q)}{dq}$$
$$= \frac{dFC(q)}{dq} + \frac{dVC(q)}{dq}$$
$$= 0 + \frac{dVC(q)}{dq}$$
$$= \frac{dVC(q)}{dq}$$

- Since fixed costs don't depend on quantity, fixed costs do not affect marginal costs
- Marginal costs are the first derivative of the variable cost

Relation between average costs and marginal costs

- For q such that MC(q) < AC(q), then average costs are decreasing
- For q such that MC(q) > AC(q), then average costs are increasing
- For q such that MC(q) AC(q), then average costs are at an inflection point (minimum/maximum)
- Some more in Chapter 22 but cannot fit into this recitation

The Producer's Problem II: Profit maximization + supply choice

Market structure

5

$$\max_{q} p(q)q - c(q)$$

.t. $q \ge 0$

- p(q) comes from inverting the demand function q(p) the firm faces
- Whether or not this resembles *the market demand function* depends on market structure
- In a pure competitive market, the firm is a "price taker": $p(q) = p^*$
- The market supply function q^S(p) is just the sum of all the individual firms' supply functions at a given P

Individual firms are "prove takes they cannot affect the prove the Market charges : they take plg) = pt as given at all qualities 12

The supply decision


s.t.

$$\max_{q} p(q)q + c(q)$$

$$\max_{q} p(q)q - c(q)$$

$$q \ge 0$$

- Constrained optimization problem
- First-order condition for an internal solution equates marginal revenue with marginal cost
- Second-order condition requires local concavity of the profit function at the local optimum



Total revenue:

TR(q) = p(q)qMarginal revenue: MR(q)= dTR(q) $= p' l_q) q + p l_q) \frac{dq}{dq} \quad (by Chain Rule)$ = g'lg) g + glg) price effect quarty effect In recitiven 7, we look at affect of changes in market structure: firms leave the market. This decreases supply which has booth a price affect and guiltably affect on produces supply. We ask which affect 15 bigger

- $\cdot p(q)$ is the quantity effect: the increase in revenue from selling an additional unit of output, which is also the price at quantity a
- p'(q)q is the price effect: the decrease in revenue associated with having to lower the price on all previous units in order to be able to sell the *q*th unit

Marginal revenue

Total revenue:

TR(q) = p(q)q

Marginal revenue:

$$MR(q) = \frac{dTR(q)}{dq}$$
$$= \frac{dp(q)q}{dq}$$
$$= \frac{dp(q)}{dq}q + p(q)\frac{dq}{dq}$$
$$= p'(q)q + p(q)$$

- In a perfectly competitive market, firms are price takers: $p(q) = p^*$ for all q
 - $p(q) = p^*$ for all q so the quantity effect is always $p^* > 0$
 - Since price is independent of quantity: p'(q) = 0 and the price effect is zero
- In an imperfectly competitive market, optimally supplying an additional good requires decreasing the market price to meet demand
 - p'(q) < 0 so the quantity effect is decreasing and the price effect is negative

First-order condition:


$$MR(q) = MC(q)$$
$$p'(q)q + p(q) = c'(q)$$

Under perfect competition,

$$p(q) = p^{*}$$
 for all q (price taking finns)
 $\therefore p'(q) = \frac{dp^{*}}{dq} = 0$
 $\therefore p(q) = p^{*} = c'(q)$: the magnal cost
 $is just the price p^{*}$
under perfect competition

- The revenue gained by one more unit of output equals the cost of producing that additional unit
 - If MR > MC, then profitable to produce more
 - If MR < MC, then the last unit was produced at a loss
- Under pure competition, p'(q) = 0and $p(q) = p^*$ so $MR(q) = p^* = c'(q)$
- Otherwise, $p(q) \ge p^*$ but MR(q) = MC(q) still holds

The second-order condition



- At an internal optimal point, the profit function must be concave
- For a competitive firm, this amounts to marginal cost being an increasing function

The second-order condition (for a competitive firm): $\frac{d^2 \{p(q)q-c(q)\}}{dq^2} < 0 \Leftrightarrow c''(q) > 0$

For a competitive Arm, plg)=pt for all q ⇒p'(q)=0 Zp "(g) =0 So plugging not the expression on previous side: p²/2). q + 2p'/2) - c"/2) 20 i.e. The second-order condition requires the profit firstern to be consider at any internal profit maximizing supply chose. Under perfect competition, this occurs whenever the cost => - c"(q) 20 forther is convers (which also means maginal cost o increasing) => c"(2) >0 or equilibrily, d M(lq) >0 18

The second-order condition (for a competitive firm): $rac{d^2 \{p(q)q-c(q)\}}{dq^2} < 0 \Leftrightarrow c''(q) > 0$ (of Cg) AC'(q)=0 when AC=MC price -taking: Demand facing p(q) = p the competition plausible supply cure: frm MC is increasing AND price > p*

By the second-order condition, q, cannot be the optional supply choice since ML is decreasing at q,

19

2 potentially the internal optimum since MC is increasing at g2

The boundary condition: profit when q = 0

- Computing local maxima give us candidates for the global maximum
- But we also need to check profit levels when q = 0
- If a firm produces zero output, it still has to pay fixed costs F so profits at q = 0 are -F
- Profits from producing at local maximum $\hat{q} > 0$ are

 $\pi(\hat{q}) = p(\hat{q})\hat{q} - VC(\hat{q}) - F$


• So producing zero output is more profitable when

 $-F > p(\hat{q})\hat{q} - VC(\hat{q} - F)$ $\Rightarrow \frac{VC(\hat{q})}{\hat{q}} > p$ $\Rightarrow AVC(\hat{q}) > p = \frac{VR(q)}{2} \left(\begin{array}{c} averagc \\ voietac \\ recover} \right)$

This is the "shutdown condition"

• Only when the marginal cost curve is above the AVC curve is it profitable to produce positive *q*

The boundary condition: profit when q = 0



Practice questions

Solutions gives in annotated Recitation 7 olides

1. A firm faces cost function $c(q) = 10 + 2q^2$ and demand $q = 600 - \frac{p}{2}$ (a) What is the optimum supply choice?

1. A firm faces cost function $c(q) = 10 + 2q^2$ and demand $q = 600 - \frac{p}{2}$ (b) What is the resulting price?

1. A firm faces cost function $c(q) = 10 + 2q^2$ and demand $q = 600 - \frac{p}{2}$ (c) What profit will the firm make?

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$ ma
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- There are 50 identical firms

(a) What is the aggregate demand in this market?

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 identical firms

(b) What is the aggregate supply in this market?

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 identical firms

(c) Find the competitive equilibrium

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 identical firms

(d) What is consumer/producer surplus?

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 10 identical firms

(e) What is the new equilibrium?

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 10 identical firms

(f) What is the new consumer/producer surplus?

2. Competitive equilibrium

Two types of consumers

- 1. Type A demand: $q_A^D(p) = 100 p$
- 2. Type B demand: $q_B^D(p) = 50 2p$

One type of firm

1. Supply function $q^{S}(p) = p$

Suppose the market features:

- There are 10 Type A consumers
- There are 20 Type B consumers
- \cdot There are 50 10 identical firms

(g) Do these changes in surplus make sense?

- The consumer population has not changed but prices have increased
- Thus, fewer consumers are being served so we should expect a decrease in CS
- There are fewer firms but prices have increased so effect on producer surprlus ambiguous
- However, prices have increased more than the quantity has decreased so total producer surplus has increased
- Each individual firm experiences an even more significant increase in surplus

31

3. Taxes, subsidies, and deadweight loss(a) Calculate the deadweight loss of a \$300 tax per unit on consumers

- $Q^{D}(p) = 12000 10p$
- $Q^{\mathrm{S}}(p) = 15p$

Example 3: Taxes, subsidies, and deadweight loss (b) Calculate the deadweight loss of a \$300 subsidy per unit to producers

- $Q^{D}(p) = 122000 10p$
- $Q^{S}(p) = 15p$